Ready. Fire. Aim

The Trump Blunderbuss Misses its Targets

Forgive me if you thought that President Trump was going to end the Ukraine war his first day in office. Or that he was going to create a powerful Department of Government Efficiency [DOGE] that would slash government spending, regulations, and bureaucrats. Or that our southern border would be “sealed” immediately.

Maybe it was all fake news. Or maybe the returning president doesn’t really know how to do his job.

On Wednesday, Trump revealed at least part of his plan to end the war in Ukraine. On Wednesday he wrote on Truth Social:

Settle now, and STOP this ridiculous War! IT’S ONLY GOING TO GET WORSE. If we don’t make a “deal,” and soon, I have no other choice but to put high levels of Taxes, Tariffs, and Sanctions on anything being sold by Russia to the United States, and various other participating countries. Let’s get this war, which never would have started if I were President, over with! We can do it the easy way, or the hard way - and the easy way is always better. It’s time to “MAKE A DEAL.” NO MORE LIVES SHOULD BE LOST!!!

The statement marks Trump’s most forceful and public effort to end the war in Ukraine. But Trump also stressed that he doesn’t want to hurt Russia. “I love the Russian people, and always had a very good relationship with President Putin,” he wrote.

I doubt that President Putin is rushing to capitulate. He just reaffirmed his close ties with China’s leader and is getting good deals from India’s Prime Minister Modi. And consider these facts from the Wall Street Journal:

With trade ties between the U.S. and Russia withering, the efficacy of Trump’s direct threat of tariffs is questionable. Russia exported about $2.9 billion worth of goods to the U.S. in 2024, according to Census Bureau data, down from $29.6 billion in 2021, before the war started.

But the U.S. has starved Russia’s economy with broad sanctions, many of which were replicated by other countries, such as an effort to cap the price of oil exported by Russia, and the decision to kick Russian banks out of the SWIFT international payments messaging system.

CRS has more background on the sanctions so far:

U.S. sanctions on Russia aim to limit and reverse Russian aggression in Ukraine and to deter broader Russian aggression and other malign activities. Since February 2022, the United States has imposed Russia-related sanctions on at least 5,750 individuals and entities, including Russian President Vladimir Putin, other Russian elites, Russia’s legislature, defense and technology firms, state-owned companies, and international facilitators of Russian sanctions evasion. U.S. sanctions also restrict Russia’s central bank from drawing on its U.S.-dollar denominated reserves, prohibit most major Russian banks from conducting most transactions in U.S. dollars or with U.S. persons, and bar new U.S. investment in Russia. The United States has expanded export controls intended to limit Russia’s access to sensitive or desired U.S.-origin goods and technology; restricted the import into the United States of energy, gold, certain diamonds and metals, and select other goods from Russia; banned the export of U.S. luxury goods and certain services to Russia; raised tariffs on many imports from Russia; and prohibited Russian use of U.S. airspace and ports.

In addition to executive branch actions, Congress has suspended normal trade relations with Russia (P.L. 117- 110), prohibited the import of Russian oil and other energy products into the United States (P.L. 117-109), established sanctions on foreign persons who engage in gold transactions with Russia (P.L. 117-263, §5590), and imposed restrictions on the import of Russian uranium (P.L. 118-62).

The United States, the EU, the United Kingdom, Canada, and other U.S. allies and partners have cooperated closely in imposing sanctions on Russia. Among other coordinated measures, the United States has joined the EU and others in banning nationals from providing maritime transport services for Russian crude oil export transactions above $60 per barrel.

By some metrics, Russia has weathered sanctions better than anticipated. Russia’s economy, the 11th largest in the world, contracted by 1.2% in 2022 before resuming growth in 2023 and 2024 of about 3.6% annually. A number of factors have buoyed Russia’s economy: monetary and banking sector policy responses by Russia’s central bank; increased oil exports to China, India, and Turkey; imports of sanctioned items through intermediaries; increased military spending and a pivot to war production; and expropriation of foreign assets.

At the same time, sanctions—and Russia’s transition to a wartime economy—have created challenges for Russia. Financial sanctions have complicated Russia’s cross-border payments, and its central bank cannot access about $280 billion held abroad. Russia’s military has difficulty procuring key materiel components, and hundreds of international companies have exited Russia. The government is running fiscal deficits and, in October 2024, the central bank increased interest rates to stem inflation. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) projects that economic growth in Russia will slow to 1.3% in 2025.

Given these results and the fact that $2.9 billion in exports from Russia amounted to only 0.1% of its GDP, additional sanctions aren’t likely to make much of a difference to Moscow.

The DOGE Dodge

Instead of the Musk-Ramiswamy juggernaut to shrink the government and its spending, the actual order signed by the new president has a different, much smaller target. As Kevin Drum notes:

According to the EO implementing it, DOGE has precisely one function:

Sec. 4. Modernizing Federal Technology and Software to Maximize Efficiency and Productivity. (a) The USDS Administrator shall commence a Software Modernization Initiative to improve the quality and efficiency of government-wide software, network infrastructure, and information technology (IT) systems. Among other things, the USDS Administrator shall work with Agency Heads to promote inter-operability between agency networks and systems, ensure data integrity, and facilitate responsible data collection and synchronization.

So that's it? Software modernization? Interoperability? The federal government has been grinding away on interoperability for more than 20 years. Just to give you an example, here's a 2004 paper just for the Department of Defense that lists 35 interoperability initiatives, 3 standards, 4 strategies, and 4 testbeds. And it comes with a vintage Word 6.0 graphic to explain everything. This is what Musk has gotten himself into.

I don't know. Maybe Musk has a clever plan to leverage this into some kind of all-powerful Rasputinish hold over the Oval Office. But it sounds more like stepping into a pool of quicksand to me. And it definitely sounds like it's light years from cutting $2 trillion in spending and turning the federal government into a lean, mean fighting machine.

There was apparently also a fight between the two leaders, and Musk [no surprise] prevailed. As the Washington Post reports:

The new structure — which has DOGE taking over the U.S. Digital Service, part of the Executive Office of the President — emerged after months of behind-the-scenes maneuvering between Musk and fellow billionaire entrepreneur Vivek Ramaswamy, the DOGE co-leader who will depart to run for governor of Ohio. Deep philosophical differences over how the panel should operate helped spur Ramaswamy to leave, according to more than a half-dozen people with knowledge of the situation, many of whom spoke on the condition of anonymity to describe private conversations.

The revamped project spurred speculation that Trump and Musk had reduced their lofty ambitions for DOGE, which initially promised to comb through the whole federal bureaucracy searching for deep cuts. But some of the people said DOGE is still poised to exert crucial influence in the new administration, in part because it could grant Musk far greater insight and control over federal operations from within the White House. Some Trump allies have even grown concerned about the extent of privileged government information that Musk could have access to under the new arrangement.

The DOGE co-leaders laid out their original vision in a joint November op-ed in the Wall Street Journal, written by Ramaswamy, that specified “three major kinds of reform: regulatory rescissions, administrative reductions and cost savings.” The piece was a road map to using the courts and policy measures to dismantle the administrative state. By contrast, the executive order announced Monday embodied Musk’s vision, focused heavily on technology and an effort to change the government from within that was at the heart of the philosophical rift between them. Trump’s Day 1 actions Monday did not include executive orders that had been drafted by Ramaswamy’s team within DOGE.

Musk and a representative for Ramaswamy did not immediately respond to a request for comment; nor did a DOGE official.

Turning USDS, the Digital Service, into DOGE solves some of the legal issues that limit an advisory panel, but that also limits what it can actually do. We’ll see what actually gets accomplished.

Sealing the Border

Troops are already moving toward the southern border, but the plans for their use are unclear, and the only people with command authority in the Pentagon are temporary Biden holdovers, pending Senate confirmation of any Trump nominees.

Acting Defense Secretary Robert Salesses is expected to sign a release order on Wednesday, according to The Associated Press, but the exact number of troops and which ones would deploy is still unclear and could fluctuate. Trump vowed on the campaign trail to send active-duty troops to the border.

The expected deployment comes just two days after Trump signed multiple executive orders relating to troop presence at the border.

One declares a national emergency at the border to allow for increased military presence.

Another authorized U.S. Northern Command (Northcom) to draft a plan for sending troops to the border — writing that the military must be present to respond to an “invasion.”

The executive order demanded detailed operational plans that are now expected in the coming days, but it did not say how many troops would deploy.

Northcom already has a border mission based out of Fort Bliss, Texas, called Joint Task Force-North.

The task force has up to 4,000 U.S. troops authorized for the border mission, primarily from the National Guard, though the number fluctuates and active-duty troops have been sent before.

Their mission is primarily to assist U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) personnel. U.S. troops are generally assisting CBP with logistical, transportation, detection and monitoring work.

But the Trump order could push the military beyond its role assisting existing immigration agents — something that would raise new legal questions.

Those legal questions are explained by lawyers writing in Just Security and Lawfare.

Chri Mirasola writes:

In his executive order, the president has directed a significant reconceptualization of USNORTHCOM around border security. USNORTHCOM was established in response to the 9/11 attacks and, per its website, is primarily concerned with “homeland defense and civil support missions.” Trump has directed that the Unified Command Plan to assign USNORTHCOM a new mission: “to seal the borders and maintain the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and security of the United States by repelling forms of invasion including unlawful mass migration, narcotics trafficking, human smuggling and trafficking, and other criminal activities.” The order also adds this mission to existing contingency planning guidance and other, more detailed, planning requirements. Finally, the Commander of USNORTHCOM must provide an estimate for what he will need to act on this guidance (called a “commander’s estimate”) within 30 days.

What would be the legal basis for USNORTHCOM to execute this mission? This and other executive orders provide a few clues.

First, and most straightforward, are statutory authorities which, without any emergency declaration, authorize Defense Department support to civil authorities. These authorities include those in Chapter 15 and Section 1059, outlined above. They also include other counterdrug authorities like 10 U.S.C. § 124, which establishes the Defense Department as the “single lead agency of the Federal Government for the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States.” The Defense Department frequently uses these authorities, and I would expect them to readily withstand judicial scrutiny.

Second, are provisions of the Insurrection Act. Trump’s emergency declaration directs the secretaries of defense and homeland security to issue a report in 90 days about other actions necessary for “complete operational control” of the border. This report will include whether the president should invoke 10 U.S.C. § 252 (what the declaration refers to as the “Insurrection Act of 1807”). That statute authorizes the president to use the military to enforce federal law when “unlawful obstructions, combinations, or assemblages, or rebellion against the authority of the United States, make it impracticable to enforce the laws of the United States in any state by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings.” Laura Dickinson has written extensively about how the Office of Legal Counsel has narrowly construed this seemingly expansive text. And, Elizabeth Goitein has noted that the Insurrection Act has never been used for immigration enforcement or border security. …

In this order, Trump asserts that “the Federal Government has failed in fulfilling this obligation to the States and [I] hereby declare that an invasion is ongoing at the southern border, which requires the Federal Government to take measures to fulfill its obligation to the States.” He then directs a number of immigration restrictions based both on statutory authority (codified in the Immigration and Naturalization Act) as well as his “express and inherent powers in Article II of the Constitution.” And as noted above, language characterizing the activities of drug cartels as an “invasion” pervades all of these executive orders.

Because this argument is so nebulous, it is difficult to parse its exact contours or project how the president might use it to justify a military deployment. As I have previously written, the executive branch has long asserted two inherent authorities to use the military within the United States. Both, however, are circumscribed in ways that make them unsuited to the expansive task Trump sets out. The first is the protective power, and it asserts the president’s ability to use the military to protect federal functions, persons, and property. The second is the emergency authority, and it asserts a military commander’s authority to use his or her troops to conduct law enforcement functions when communication with higher authority has utterly broken down and local law enforcement has lost control of law and order. The executive branch has asserted that both are rooted in the president’s authority under the Take Care Clause. Neither of these doctrines, however, would justify a large-scale military deployment aimed generally at expelling migrants.

It’s worrisome that actions are being taken based on questionable legal theories and without Senate-confirmed Trump nominees in charge. The administration needs a plan, recommended by professionals and vetted by the Constitutional lawyers, before troops are sent in.

Slaughter of the Innocents

The national security parts of the new administration are purging professionals without due regard to their need for expertise and institutional knowledge. National Security Adviser Michael Waltz, who isn’t subject to Senate confirmation, is already slashing the NSC staff in order to make room for loyalists.

Axios has some details:

The Trump administration is screening the loyalty of approximately 160 career civil servants assigned to the National Security Council.

Why it matters: The screenings are part of a larger push by President Trump to reshape the federal workforce that includes staffing the administration with loyalists and making it easier to fire civil servants.

State of play: There are approximately 160 civil servants, known as detailees, on the NSC whose employment is being reviewed. These reviews are at "different stages" but nearly all "are being impacted today," a national security source briefed on the matter told Axios Wednesday.

• The sidelined detailees have been told to temporarily work from home as the process continues, per AP, which first reported the story.

• Meanwhile, new detailees, including some that had served during the first Trump administration, are being brought on, per AP.

Catch up quick: Even before President Trump took office, members of his administration began questioning NSC employees about their political affiliations and actions, to suss out their loyalty to Trump, AP reported earlier this month.

• Trump's national security adviser Mike Waltz had told Breitbart News earlier this month that career civil servants detailed to the NSC during the Biden administration would be returned to their home federal agencies and departments.

As the Washington Post has more:

“Since 12:01 pm on Monday personnel reviews and decisions based on the evaluations are being made,” [spokesman Brian] Hughes said in the statement.

The officials, known as aides or detailees, were told Wednesday in a brief call conducted by Waltz’s chief of staff, Brian McCormack, that they were to leave the building immediately, go home and be “on call.” They were given instructions to return only if asked by their supervisors — senior directors appointed by the Trump administration, according to two people familiar with the matter, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to describe personnel matters.

The decision by Waltz came so abruptly that it impeded the ability of some career officials to physically leave the White House complex because their badges no longer worked, said a U.S. official. The awkward impasse required the Secret Service to manually drop the gates for those with deactivated badges.

One former NSC official said that given the classified nature of the NSC’s work, it would be practically impossible for staff to work from home. The resulting lack of career staff to aid with the transition could make it more challenging for the new team to grapple with substantive security issues, the former official said, speaking on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive matters.

This is unfortunate for the individuals affected, but also regrettable in terms of effective policy. You need the professionals to get things done right.

Four misfires… enough for today.