The Myth of Surgical Strikes
Destroying Fordow would not be the end of the war
President Trump seems to be uncertain as to whether to send B-2 bombers against the Fordow nuclear facility. The more important question is whether destroying Fordow would prevent an Iranian bomb? The answer is no.
History shows that most leaders begin wars expecting them to be short. That rarely happens. Since the invention of airplanes, political leaders have looked for airpower to win wars quickly. That hasn’t happened. Time and again, American leaders have looked for “surgical strikes” that can win wars without the costly and risky use of ground forces. That is a delusion.
During the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, President Kennedy wanted to avoid a direct invasion of Cuba and hoped that the newly detected Soviet missiles could be destroy by air strikes. His generals told him, however, that to attack the missiles, the United States first had to destroy Cuban air defenses and command and control. Instead of 52 sorties to hit only the missiles and storage sites, it would take 194 to destroy Soviet warplanes, air defenses, and cruise missiles – and over 2000 to hit all military targets prior to an invasion. Those numbers tilted Kennedy to a naval blockade option.
Ronald Reagan sent punishment air strikes in Lebanon and Libya because the risks of ground forces were too high. Bill Clinton used air attacks rather than ground forces in Bosnia and Kosovo. The U.S. conducted unsuccessful decapitation strikes on Saddam Hussein in 1991, 1998 and 2003 before eventually sending in ground troops. Donald Trump spent $1 billion on air strikes to stop Houthi attacks on shipping but U.S. ships are still avoiding travel through the Red Sea.
Three decades ago, Professor Robert Pape analyzed the history of coercive bombing and concluded bombing failed to be decisive. Just this week, he reached the same conclusions about the Israeli-Iranian war.
Airpower, even when paired with intelligence networks, has never toppled a government. Since the dawn of strategic bombing doctrines in World War I, early airpower theorists were captivated by the idea that, if organized correctly, bombing campaigns could encourage populations to revolt against their own governments. Since then, militaries have attempted a wide variety of schemes, including the intense bombing of cities to compel civilians to rise up and demand that their government make whatever concessions necessary to halt the assault. In over 40 instances of strategic bombing from World War I to the first Gulf War in 1991, such barrages, whether concentrated and heavy or light and dispersed, never compelled civilians to take to the streets in any meaningful numbers to oppose their governments.
Israeli airpower cannot decisively knock out Iran’s nuclear program; Iran could reassemble its program from the remnants covertly, with even less Western oversight and intelligence about weapons development. If Israel had a plan to launch a military coup against the Iranian government, it likely would already have pursued it. Without U.S. intervention on Israel’s behalf, Israel will be alone, with no good options, facing a more dangerous Iran than it ever has. As the situation stands now, the conflict is escalating into a “war of the cities” between Tel Aviv and Tehran, as Israel and Iran assail densely populated urban areas. As civilian casualties mount, both countries are likely to grow more defiant, with increasingly disastrous consequences.
What if the United States, with its bunker-busting bombs, joins the attack? Could Israel actually knock out Iran’s weapons program with such support? Even if President Donald Trump were to take up Gallant’s request to bomb Fordow, and even if the United States’ large bunker-buster bombs could burrow all the way into Fordow’s most deeply buried chambers, the United States and Israel would still face more challenges to eliminating Iran’s ability to acquire nuclear weapons. There would be no “mission accomplished” moment in which both countries could conclude with absolute confidence that Iran could not proceed covertly. If anything, a U.S.-assisted attack on Iranian facilities would only put the United States directly in Iran’s nuclear cross hairs rather than solve the problem for good.
Second, aside from Iran’s enrichment facilities, the Bushehr reactor, which is approximately 11 miles southeast of the city of Bushehr, presents a significant challenge. The reactor can be modified to generate plutonium that could be used for nuclear weapons. This risk cannot be eliminated as long as the reactor exists. But if Israel were to destroy the Bushehr reactor, it could risk the release of a Chernobyl-like radiological plume over the city, which is home to roughly 200,000 people, as well as over population centers across the Persian Gulf. It would also invite Iranian ballistic missile retaliation against Israel’s nuclear reactor complex at Dimona.
Last, and most important, even following extensive airstrikes against the nuclear facilities, significant uncertainty about the condition of surviving elements and their ability to be reconstituted would remain. Without onsite inspections, Israel would not be able to conduct reliable assessments of the damage done to Iran’s uranium enrichment capabilities and existing stocks of enriched uranium. Iran is not likely to allow international inspectors, much less U.S. or Israeli teams, to assess the exact degree of damage to its enriched uranium stocks, determine whether usable equipment or material has been removed before or after strikes, or pinpoint the manufacturing locations for the components for Iran’s significant domestic centrifuge production. Commando teams could attempt onsite reconnaissance but would face obvious risks of attack by Iranian forces. This lack of knowledge means that Israel—even with the United States’ help—would never be confident that Iran no longer has a path to the bomb. Concerns about Iran nuclearizing in secret would fester, mirroring the fears that drove the United States in 2003 to launch a ground war to conquer Iraq in search of nonexistent weapons of mass destruction.
Unfortunately, the Iran hawks are pushing for war without considering the difficulties. Former National Security Adviser John Bolton says, “Bomb Fordo and be done with it. I think that this is long overdue.” Senator Lindsey Graham [R-SC] says, “It’s time to close the chapter on the ayatollah and his henchmen. Let’s close it soon and start a new chapter in the Mideast: one of tolerance, hope, and peace.”
Others in Trump’s MAGA coalition are urging restraint. Vice President Vance has been carefully cautious.
By [late May], Mr. Vance was telling associates that he was worried about a potential regime change war, which he considered a dangerous escalation that could spiral out of control.
Mr. Vance had come to view a conflict between Israel and Iran as inevitable. The vice president was open to the possibility of supporting a targeted Israeli strike, but his concerns that it would grow into a more drawn-out war increased as the likely date of a strike approached, according to two people with knowledge of his thinking.
He turned his attention toward trying to keep America out of the conflict as much as possible beyond intelligence sharing. He worked closely with Mr. Trump’s inner circle, including Mr. Rubio, Mr. Hegseth and Susie Wiles, the White House chief of staff, to figure out contingency plans to protect American personnel in the region.
The New York Times has a target list showing that American forces in the region would be vulnerable to Iranian retaliation.
The bigger problem with a Fordow attack is its disconnection from a broader strategy. As former Centcom commander Admiral William Fallon told the NY Times, he had concerns about Iran spiraling out of control after an American strike. “What’s the plan?” he said. “What’s the strategy? What’s the desired end state? Iran not having a nuclear weapon is something few people would disagree with. But what is the relationship we would have with Iran in the bigger Middle East? We’re just knee-jerking.’’
Trump’s call for “UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER” suggests a strategic goal of regime change, not simply a verifiable deal to prevent development of nuclear weapons. But regime change requires a new leadership that could somehow pacify a defeated Iranian populace.
Before attacking Fordow, a wise administration should be able to answer several questions.
- How will we respond to Iranian retaliation?
- Does Israel have enough troops to occupy parts of Iran as well as Gaza?
- Are we willing to send in ground troops? Under what conditions?
- What are the minimum demands we must make of the Iranians?
- How do we get an acceptable regime in Tehran?
Long ago, U.S. military leaders like Colin Powell insisted on planning strategy by defining end states and off ramps and decisive force. They wanted America do whole of government planning for both the war and the days after.
Before we join the fight, we should be clear-minded about the costs and risks ahead.
And, by the way, Congress should be consulted and should take a firm vote, Yes or No. [I hope they’ll vote No.]